The Choice of Optimal Protection under Oligopoly: Import Tariff v. Production Subsidy

Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu

The Japanese Economic Review, 2002, vol. 53, issue 3, 301-314

Abstract: Economists researching the area of optimal protection have tended to analyse the ranking of alternative policy tools in the presence of perfect competition, either when the government in an importing country achieves a non‐economic target, or when there is a market distortion. Assuming international oligopolistic competition, I reconsider the choice of optimal policy instruments, i.e. an import tariff and a production subsidy. I show that the choice of optimal policy instruments depends on the relative number of home firms and foreign ones and on the magnitude of international cost differences. JEL Classification Numbers: F12, F13.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5876.00230

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:53:y:2002:i:3:p:301-314

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1352-4739

Access Statistics for this article

The Japanese Economic Review is currently edited by Akira Okada

More articles in The Japanese Economic Review from Japanese Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().