The Erosion and Sustainability of Norms and Morale

Michihiro Kandori

The Japanese Economic Review, 2003, vol. 54, issue 1, 29-48

Abstract: I examine why the performance of an organization is often subject to gradual erosion. I assume that players are motivated partly by psychological factors, norms and morale, and that they are willing to exert extra efforts if others do so. I show that repeated random shocks induce the erosion of the extra efforts supported by norms and morale, but they do not completely decay; in the long run a certain range of efforts are sustainable. Hence different organizations typically enjoy diverse norms and morale, which persist for a long time, in the vicinity of the equilibrium determined by material incentives.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5876.00244

Related works:
Working Paper: The Erosion and Sustainability of Norms and Morale (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:54:y:2003:i:1:p:29-48

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1352-4739

Access Statistics for this article

The Japanese Economic Review is currently edited by Akira Okada

More articles in The Japanese Economic Review from Japanese Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().