The Possibility of Issue‐Specific Decisions on Multiple Social Choice Issues

Midori Hirokawa

The Japanese Economic Review, 2003, vol. 54, issue 1, 86-100

Abstract: This paper considers an aggregation rule when each alternative consists of elements of multiple issues. I assume that each issue‐specific aggregation rule can be applied to each issue and explore whether various different issue‐specific aggregation rules are compatible. When the set of alternatives has some structure (which we call a set connected by loops), there exists a powerful individual whose preference always coincides with the social ordering in every issue. As a corollary, Arrow's General Possibility Theorem is obtained.

Date: 2003
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