Exit from Rent‐Seeking Contests

Jun-ichi Itaya () and Hiroyuki Sano

The Japanese Economic Review, 2003, vol. 54, issue 2, 218-228

Abstract: The object of this paper is to investigate the long‐run behaviour of rent‐seekers in a situation where they incur negative expected payoffs due to increasing returns to rent‐seeking expenditures. To this end, we embed the one‐shot rent‐seeking game presented by Tullock (1980) in the war‐of‐attrition framework. In this multi‐period setting, each player not only determines his or her rent‐seeking expenditure but also chooses a mixed strategy on whether to stay in or exit from rent‐seeking competition in each period. JEL Classification Numbers: D72, C72, L12

Date: 2003
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