Partial Ownership For The Public Firm And Competition

Sang-Ho Lee () and Hae‐Shin Hwang

The Japanese Economic Review, 2003, vol. 54, issue 3, 324-335

Abstract: This paper investigates the issue of partial ownership (partial privatization) of a state‐owned public enterprise. We elaborate on the framework of Matsumura (1998) by allowing for managerial inefficiency, and show that under moderate conditions partial ownership is a reasonable choice of government in a monopoly market as well as in a mixed duopoly market, where a public firm competes with a profit‐maximizing private firm. We also provide some economic rationale on the result that neither full privatization nor full nation‐alization is optimum.

Date: 2003
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