SHARECROPPING, LAND EXPLOITATION AND LAND‐IMPROVING INVESTMENTS*

Tridip Ray

The Japanese Economic Review, 2005, vol. 56, issue 2, 127-143

Abstract: This paper analyses the tenancy problem in a dynamic setup and addresses two long‐standing issues: inefficiency and lack of investment. It considers the problems that the tenant, with a shorter‐term interest in the farm than the landlord, might overexploit the land to maximize immediate returns even at the cost of future damages, and under‐supply long‐run productivity improving investments in land. I show that the efficient (first‐best) levels of input use and investment can be achieved (both in the steady state and in transition) by a suitable share contract which, by dampening incentives to maximize current returns, addresses the land exploitation problem, and by an appropriate cost allocation rule which can address the investment problem.

Date: 2005
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