INCOMPLETE INFORMATION GAMES WITH MULTIPLE PRIORS*

Atsushi Kajii and Takashi Ui

The Japanese Economic Review, 2005, vol. 56, issue 3, 332-351

Abstract: We present a model of incomplete information games, where each player is endowed with a set of priors. Upon arrival of private information, it is assumed that each player “updates” his set of priors to a set of posterior beliefs, and then evaluates his actions by the most pessimistic posterior beliefs. So each player's preferences may exhibit aversion to ambiguity or uncertainty. We define a couple of equilibrium concepts, establish existence results for them, and demonstrate by examples how players’ views on uncertainty about the environment affect the strategic outcomes.

Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00327.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:56:y:2005:i:3:p:332-351

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1352-4739

Access Statistics for this article

The Japanese Economic Review is currently edited by Akira Okada

More articles in The Japanese Economic Review from Japanese Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().