RISKY VERSUS RISKLESS BARGAINING PROCEDURES: THE AUMANN‐ROTH CONTROVERSY REVISITED*

Maria Montero and Akira Okada

The Japanese Economic Review, 2007, vol. 58, issue 2, 294-302

Abstract: In a series of papers, Aumann and Roth discussed a game in which players can cooperate in pairs and two of them prefer to form a coalition with each other. Roth argued that the only rational outcome is that the players who prefer each other form a coalition; Aumann argued that all three coalitions are possible because the players have a problem of expectation coordination. A non‐cooperative analysis provides additional support for Aumann's arguments and shows that the difference between Aumann's and Roth's views can be traced back to a difference (risky versus/riskless) in the bargaining procedure.

Date: 2007
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