QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION, WELFARE, AND THE MODE OF COMPETITION IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKET: A NOTE*

Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu and Naoto Jinji

The Japanese Economic Review, 2007, vol. 58, issue 3, 407-416

Abstract: We analyse the implications of quality differences in a vertically differentiated product market for social welfare by employing an endogenous quality choice model. We find that in of Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, the degree of quality differentiation at equilibrium in an unregulated market is larger or smaller, respectively, than that of the socially second‐best optimum. This implies that a reduction in quality difference, respectively, increases or decreases social welfare in the case of Bertrand or Cournot duopolies.

Date: 2007
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