EVOLUTIONARY DRIFT IN PREFERENCE AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION*

Tetsuo Yamamori

The Japanese Economic Review, 2009, vol. 60, issue 3, 362-375

Abstract: This paper studies the situation where myopic players repeatedly face a society with two actions where their common fitness exhibits economies of scale. Both states in which all players choose the same actions are equilibria. In each period, players adjust their actions based on their preferences, which are in turn shaped by natural selection. The preferences of the players need not match the underlying fitness. When rare mutations are introduced into the evolutionary process, their preferences may drift without affecting equilibrium behaviour. This paper shows that these drifts influence the results of equilibrium selection.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2008.00453.x

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