ANTI‐DUAL OF ECONOMIC COALITIONAL TU GAMES*
Takayuki Oishi and
The Japanese Economic Review, 2009, vol. 60, issue 4, 560-566
Some well‐known coalitional TU (transferable utility) games applied to specific economic problems are shown to be connected through the relation defined as the anti‐dual. Solutions such as the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus of anti‐dual games are obtained straightforwardly from original games.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:60:y:2009:i:4:p:560-566
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1352-4739
Access Statistics for this article
The Japanese Economic Review is currently edited by Akira Okada
More articles in The Japanese Economic Review from Japanese Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().