A NOTE ON DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLISTS: COMMITMENT TO FORWARD COMPATIBILITY

Sang-Ho Lee () and Le Duc Niem

The Japanese Economic Review, 2010, vol. 61, issue 4, 558-564

Abstract: This note re-examines the previous results on durable goods monopolists under the time inconsistency problem that the firm tends to make its goods less compatible as a “planned obsolescence” strategy in the presence of network effects. We find that the possibility of the commitment to forward compatibility is profitable to the monopolist, depending upon the degree of technological progress and network effects. Therefore, contractual commitments that are frequently feasible and observed in real‐world markets make the society better off.

Keywords: L1; D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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