Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Paul Klemperer

Journal of Economic Surveys, 1999, vol. 13, issue 3, 227-286

Abstract: This paper provides an elementary, non‐technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.); We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk‐aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi‐unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and a bibliography for each section.

Date: 1999
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Working Paper: Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature (1999)
Working Paper: Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature (1999)
Working Paper: Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature (1999)
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