INDEPENDENT FISCAL AGENCIES
Xavier Debrun,
David Hauner and
Manmohan S. Kumar
Journal of Economic Surveys, 2009, vol. 23, issue 1, 44-81
Abstract:
Abstract There has been a considerable literature regarding the incentives of policymakers as a prime reason for persistent fiscal deficits and a variety of fiscal rules have been proposed as a remedy. However, the often inadequate flexibility of rules and the success of policy delegation in the monetary realm have motivated a small but growing number of studies that suggest delegating some aspects of fiscal policy to what will here be called ‘independent fiscal agencies’. This paper surveys the related literature with a focus on three aspects: the motivation for the establishment of such agencies; their potential design; and the experience with these types of institutions.
Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2008.00556.x
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:23:y:2009:i:1:p:44-81
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