The Theory of Warranty Contracts

Winand Emons

Journal of Economic Surveys, 1989, vol. 3, issue 1, 43-57

Abstract: This paper surveys theories of the existence and design of warranty contracts. Insurance, signaling, and incentive motives are used to explain the existence of warranties. The incorporation of imperfections that prevent warranties from serving their basic purpose in a first-best way describes actual warranty practices. Copyright 1989 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:3:y:1989:i:1:p:43-57

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