Majority Rule and Election Models

Peter Coughlin

Journal of Economic Surveys, 1990, vol. 4, issue 2, 157-88

Abstract: This paper surveys the theoretical work that has been done on majority rule and economic models of elections. Section 1 provides an overview of the topic. Section 2 reviews the most important results that have been obtained about majority rule as an abstract collective choice rule. Section 3 identifies some alternative inferences that can be made from those results. Section 4 covers some models that include additional features that are present in political institutions where majority rule is used. Section 5 concentrates on some alternative election models and equilibrium concepts. Section 6 focuses on election models with abstentions and/or candidate uncertainty about voter behavior. Section 7 compares and contrasts models where candidates are certain about what the voters' choices will be (contingent upon about the choices made by the candidates) and models where they are uncertain about those choices. Section 8 closes the survey by identifying some emerging areas of research. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

Date: 1990
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