Career Concerns: Incentives and Endogenous Learning in Labour Markets
Jeff Borland ()
Journal of Economic Surveys, 1992, vol. 6, issue 3, 251-70
Models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity, and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm's owner. This survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns (hidden action and hidden information), and discusses some extensions of these models. Applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:6:y:1992:i:3:p:251-70
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