EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available

Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó () and Rafael Di Tella

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2007, vol. 16, issue 3, 577-598

Abstract: "We present a model where a long run player is allowed to use both money transfers and threats to influence the decisions of a sequence of short run players. We show that threats might be used credibly (even in arbitrarily short repeated games) by a long-lived player who gains by developing a reputation of carrying out punishments. Particular cases of the model are a long-lived pressure group offering rewards and punishments to a series of targets (public or corporate officials) in exchange for policy favors, or that of a long-lived extorter who demands money in order not to punish. We use the model to analyze the "convicted nonpayor" debate around judicial corruption. The model highlights formal similarities between lobbying and extortion." Copyright 2007, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing.

Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent ... &year=2007&part=null link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:16:y:2007:i:3:p:577-598

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... ref=1058-6407&site=1

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-20
Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:16:y:2007:i:3:p:577-598