Little Firms and Big Patents: A Model of Small‐Firm Patent Signaling

Wolfgang Gick

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2008, vol. 17, issue 4, 913-935

Abstract: Patent strategies of small technology‐intensive firms are difficult to explain with standard incentive arguments based on intellectual property rights. This paper develops a rationale for patent filing as a disclosure strategy. We develop a two‐sender signaling game to study patenting incentives of two technology start‐ups to file in a large‐scale patent system with the goal to attract a user firm. Both start‐ups may decide to invest in costly modification of their patent application before filing. The paper identifies a separating equilibrium in which the high‐quality inventor files and so separates from its technology competitor. Of particular interest is the study of pooling and semi‐separating equilibria, as well as the impact of subsidies. We find that a higher quality of a country's inventions, reflected in the possible innovative steps and thus in higher expected profits for foreign user firms, may increase the chance of the relatively lower‐quality inventor to enter international technology markets.

Date: 2008
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00200.x

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