Asymmetric sequential search under incomplete information

Yizhaq Minchuk and Aner Sela

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2018, vol. 27, issue 2, 315-325

Abstract: We study a multistage sequential search model with n agents who compete for one job. The agents arrive sequentially, each one in a different stage. The agents' abilities, which are private information, are derived from heterogeneous distribution functions. In each stage, the designer chooses an ability threshold. If an agent has a higher ability than the threshold in the stage in which he arrives, he gets the job and the search is over. The agent's ability is not revealed when he wins the job and the designer has only an estimation of this ability according to the threshold placed by him. We analyze the optimal ability thresholds imposed by the designer who wishes to maximize the ability estimation of the agent who gets the job net of the search cost. We also investigate the relation between the optimal ability thresholds as well as the optimal order of agents in all stages according to the agents' distributions of abilities.

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12242

Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information (2015)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:27:y:2018:i:2:p:315-325

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... ref=1058-6407&site=1

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().