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Nursing‐homes' competition and distributional implications when the market is two‐sided

David Bardey and Luigi Siciliani ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2021, vol. 30, issue 2, 472-500

Abstract: We investigate the effect of competition in the nursing‐homes sector with a two‐sided market approach. Using a Hotelling model, our key findings are that (i) the two‐sidedness of the market leads to higher wages for nurses, (ii) this is then passed to residents in the form of higher prices, and (iii) nursing‐homes profits are instead unaffected. In contrast, when nurses wages are regulated, the two‐sidedness of the market implies a transfer between residents and nursing homes. When residents' price is regulated, it implies a transfer between nurses and nursing homes. These key results are generally robust to institutional settings which employ pay‐for‐performance schemes, the presence of altruistic motives of nursing homes and the heterogeneity in residents reservation utility.

Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Nursing Homes'Competition and Distributional Implications when the Market is Two-Sided (2018) Downloads
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:30:y:2021:i:2:p:472-500