Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition

Esther Gal‐Or
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Esther Gal-Or ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997, vol. 6, issue 1, 235-256

Abstract: This paper surveys recent work in contract theory that relates to the allocation of tasks among agents within an organization as well as to the effect of product market competition upon optimal contracting and agency costs.

Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00235.x

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