Making More from Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Robert Weber ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997, vol. 6, issue 3, 529-548

Abstract: When multiple items are sold through the use of simultaneous ascending‐bid auctions, bidders can find it in their mutual interests to reduce their aggregate demand for the items while prices are still low relative to the bidders' valuations. The FCC's first broadband PCS auction provides examples of how such mutual reductions might be arranged even when the bidders are not allowed to communicate with one another outside of the auction arena.

Date: 1997
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