Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives-Reply
Ching-to Ma ()
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1998, vol. 7, issue 1, 139-142
I reconsider the implementation of efficient cost and quality efforts when health-care providers may refuse services to consumers, and introduce a mechanism that is a combination of prospective payment and cost reimbursement. Conditions are derived for the prospective payment level and the margin above cost reimbursement for the implementation of efficient efforts. Copyright (c) 1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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