Health‐Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply

Ching-to Ma

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1998, vol. 7, issue 1, 139-142

Abstract: I reconsider the implementation of efficient cost and quality efforts when health‐care providers may refuse services to consumers, and introduce a mechanism that is a combination of prospective payment and cost reimbursement. Conditions are derived for the prospective payment level and the margin above cost reimbursement for the implementation of efficient efforts.

Date: 1998
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