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Competition for Managers and Product Market Efficiency

Fátima Barros and Inés Macho‐Stadler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ines Macho-Stadler ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1998, vol. 7, issue 1, 89-103

Abstract: We investigate whether competition between two firms to hire managers with different abilities might affect efficiency in the product market, when a manager's effort is his/her private information. We conclude that competition for managers might lead to an improvement in efficiency in the market of the firm that attracts the most efficient manager. Competition for managers might even eliminate the productive efficiency loss due to the asymmetry of information in the firm‐manager relationship.

Date: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:7:y:1998:i:1:p:89-103