Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs, and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms

Anup Agrawal and Nandu J Nagarajan

Journal of Finance, 1990, vol. 45, issue 4, 1325-31

Abstract: This paper provides evidence that all-equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all-equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all-equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage. Copyright 1990 by American Finance Association.

Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (60)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1082%2819900 ... O%3B2-J&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:45:y:1990:i:4:p:1325-31

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Finance from American Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().