The Mode of Acquisition in Takeovers: Taxes and Asymmetric Information

David T Brown and Michael D Ryngaert

Journal of Finance, 1991, vol. 46, issue 2, 653-69

Abstract: The authors develop a model in which the mode of acquisition conveys information concerning the value of the bidder. The model incorporates the possibility that offers containing both cash and stock can be made in a setting consistent with the U.S. tax code. The authors demonstrate that bidders with unfavorable private information about their equity value choose offers containing some stock to avoid the capital gains tax on sequences of cash offers. The model yields a number of unique predictions about the construction of acquisition offers. The authors present evidence consistent with the model. Copyright 1991 by American Finance Association.

Date: 1991
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