Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover

Kenneth J Martin and John J McConnell

Journal of Finance, 1991, vol. 46, issue 2, 671-87

Abstract: This paper examines the hypothesis that an important role of corporate takeovers is to discipline the top managers of poorly performing target firms. The authors document that the turnover rate for the top manager of target firms in tender offer-takeovers significantly increases following completion of the takeover and that prior to the takeover these firms were significantly under-performing other firms in their industry as well as other target firms which had no post-takeover change in the top executive. We interpret the results to indicate that the takeover market plays an important role in controlling the nonvalue maximizing behavior of top corporate managers. Copyright 1991 by American Finance Association.

Date: 1991
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