Moral Hazard and the Portfolio Management Problem

Neal M Stoughton

Journal of Finance, 1993, vol. 48, issue 5, 2009-28

Abstract: This paper investigates the significance of nonlinear contracts on the incentive for portfolio managers to collect information. In addition, the manager must be motivated to disclose this information truthfully. The author analyzes three contracting regimes: (1) first-best where effort is observable, (2) linear with unobservable effort, and (3) the optimal contract within the Bhattacharya-Pfleiderer quadratic class. He finds that the linear contract leads to a serious lack of effort expenditure by the manager. This underinvestment problem can be successfully overcome through the use of quadratic contracts. These contracts are shown to be asymptotically optimal for very risk-tolerant principals. Copyright 1993 by American Finance Association.

Date: 1993
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (72)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1082%2819931 ... O%3B2-8&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:48:y:1993:i:5:p:2009-28

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Finance from American Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().