Managers, Owners, and the Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical Analysis

Bagnani, Elizabeth Strock, et al

Journal of Finance, 1994, vol. 49, issue 2, 453-77

Abstract: This article examines managerial ownership structure and return premia on corporate bonds. It is argued that, when managerial ownership is low, an increase in managerial ownership increases management's incentives to increase stockholder wealth at the expense of bondholder wealth. When ownership increases more, however, it is argued that management becomes more risk averse, with incentives more closely aligned with bondholders. This study finds a positive relation between managerial ownership and bond return premia in the low to medium (5 to 25 percent) ownership range. There is also weak evidence for a nonpositive relation in the large (over 25 percent) ownership range. Coauthors are Nikolaos T. Milonas, Anthony Saunders, and Nickolaos G. Travlos. Copyright 1994 by American Finance Association.

Date: 1994
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