Asymmetric Information, Managerial Opportunism, Financing, and Payout Policies

Thomas Noe (thomas.noe@sbs.ox.ac.uk) and Michael J Rebello

Journal of Finance, 1996, vol. 51, issue 2, 637-60

Abstract: The authors examine corporate issuance and payout policies in the presence of both adverse selection (in capital markets) and managerial opportunism. Their results establish the importance of the locus of decision control in the firm. When shareholders determine policies, debt financing is always optimal in the presence of either adverse selection or managerial opportunism. However, when both of these problems are simultaneously present, equity issuance can become an optimal signaling mechanism. Shareholder's most preferred signaling mechanism is restricting dividends, followed by equity financing and, finally, underpricing securities. When managers determine policies, a reversed hierarchy may be obtained. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.

Date: 1996
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