The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets

Steven R Grenadier

Journal of Finance, 1996, vol. 51, issue 5, 1653-79

Abstract: This article develops an equilibrium framework for strategic option exercise games. The author focuses on a particular example: the timing of real estate development. An analysis of the equilibrium exercise policies of developers provides insights into the forces that shape market behavior. The model isolates the factors that make some markets prone to bursts of concentrated development. The model also provides an explanation for why some markets may experience building booms in the face of declining demand and property values. While such behavior is often regarded as irrational overbuilding, the model provides a rational foundation for such exercise patterns. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (268)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1082%2819961 ... O%3B2-C&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:51:y:1996:i:5:p:1653-79

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Finance from American Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().