Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics

Stijn Claessens ()

Journal of Finance, 1997, vol. 52, issue 4, 1641-58

Abstract: The Czech and Slovak Republics' mass privatization scheme used voucher points distributed to the population and a competitive bidding process to change the governance of a large number of firms. Voucher prices and following secondary market prices are shown to depend upon the resulting ownership structures. The more concentrated ownership is, the higher prices are. High absolute ownership by a single domestic investor is associated with even higher voucher prices. The author finds some evidence that initially prices are relatively lower when a bank-sponsored investment fund has a relatively large stake in a firm. This suggests conflicts of interest. Copyright 1997 by American Finance Association.

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Corporate governance and equity prices: evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics (1995)
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