Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐ de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes ()

Journal of Finance, 2000, vol. 55, issue 1, 1-33

Abstract: This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the “outcome model,” dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the “substitute model,” insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (967)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00199

Related works:
Working Paper: Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World (2000)
Working Paper: Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World (1998)
Working Paper: Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:55:y:2000:i:1:p:1-33

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Finance from American Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().