Valuation and Control in Venture Finance

Andrei A. Kirilenko

Journal of Finance, 2001, vol. 56, issue 2, 565-587

Abstract: This paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm. I assume that the entrepreneur derives private nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm. I show that to separate the entrepreneur's value of control from the firm's expected payoff, the venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control rights than the size of his equity investment. The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:56:y:2001:i:2:p:565-587

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