Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective

Mark R. Huson, Robert Parrino and Laura T. Starks

Journal of Finance, 2001, vol. 56, issue 6, 2265-2297

Abstract: We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:56:y:2001:i:6:p:2265-2297

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