Risk Aversion, Transparency, and Market Performance

M. Ángeles De Frutos and Carolina Manzano ()

Journal of Finance, 2002, vol. 57, issue 2, 959-984

Abstract: Using a model of market making with inventories based on Biais (1993), we find that investors obtain more favorable execution prices, and they hence invest more, when markets are fragmented. In our model, risk‐averse dealers use less aggressive price strategies in more transparent markets (centralized) because quote dissemination alleviates uncertainty about the prices quoted by other dealers and, hence, reduces the need to compete aggressively for order flow. Further, we show that the move toward greater transparency (centralization) may have detrimental effects on liquidity and welfare.

Date: 2002
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