Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐ De‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny

Journal of Finance, 2002, vol. 57, issue 3, 1147-1170

Abstract: We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash‐flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash‐flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.

Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1299)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00457

Related works:
Working Paper: Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation (2002)
Working Paper: Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation (1999)
Working Paper: Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:57:y:2002:i:3:p:1147-1170

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