Performance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility

Rajesh Aggarwal and Andrew Samwick

Journal of Finance, 2003, vol. 58, issue 4, 1613-1650

Abstract: We show that top management incentives vary by responsibility. For oversight executives, pay‐performance incentives are $1.22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than for divisional executives. For CEOs, incentives are $5.65 higher than for divisional executives. Incentives for the median top management team are substantial at $32.32. CEOs account for 42 to 58 percent of aggregate team incentives. For divisional executives, the pay–divisional performance sensitivity is positive and increasing in the precision of divisional performance and the pay–firm performance sensitivity is decreasing in the precision of divisional performance. These results support principal–agent models with multiple signals of managerial effort.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (73)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00579

Related works:
Working Paper: Performance Incentives Within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:4:p:1613-1650

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Finance from American Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().