Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence

Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe and Michael J. Rebello

Journal of Finance, 2003, vol. 58, issue 5, 1997-2031

Abstract: We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed “watchdogs” can implement institutionally preferred policies. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. Our model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. However, penalties for dissent appeared to have little impact on the experimental outcomes.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00595

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:5:p:1997-2031

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Finance from American Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().