Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts' Incentives to Follow Firms

Robert M. Bushman, Joseph D. Piotroski and Abbie J. Smith

Journal of Finance, 2005, vol. 60, issue 1, 35-66

Abstract: Motivated by extant finance theory predicting that insider trading crowds out private information acquisition by outsiders, we use data for 100 countries for the years 1987–2000 to study whether analyst following in a country increases following restriction of insider trading activities. We document that analyst following increases after initial enforcement of insider trading laws. This increase is concentrated in emerging market countries, but is smaller if the country has previously liberalized its capital market. We also find that analyst following responds less intensely to initial enforcement when a country has a preexisting portfolio of strong investor protections.

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00724.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:60:y:2005:i:1:p:35-66

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