Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective

Tod Perry and Urs Peyer ()

Journal of Finance, 2005, vol. 60, issue 4, 2083-2123

Abstract: While reformers have argued that multiple directorships for executives can destroy value, we investigate firms with executives that accept an outside directorship and find negative announcement returns only when the executive's firm has greater agency problems. When fewer agency concerns exist, additional directorships relate to increased firm value. Announcement returns are also higher when executives accept an outside directorship in a financial, high‐growth, or related‐industry firm. Our results suggest that outside directorships for executives can enhance firm value, which has important implications for firms employing executives nominated for outside boards and for policy recommendations restricting the number of directorships.

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00788.x

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