Optimal Debt and Equity Values in the Presence of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11

Mark Broadie, Mikhail Chernov and Suresh Sundaresan

Journal of Finance, 2007, vol. 62, issue 3, 1341-1377

Abstract: Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. In the first–best outcome, reorganization adds value to both parties via higher debt capacity, lower credit spreads, and improved overall firm value. If control of the ex ante reorganization timing and the ex post decision to liquidate is given to borrowers, most of the benefits are appropriated by borrowers ex post. Lenders can restore the first–best outcome by seizing this control or by the ex post transfer of control rights. Reorganization is more likely and liquidation is less likely relative to the benchmark case with liquidation only.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:62:y:2007:i:3:p:1341-1377

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