Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross‐listing Decision

Craig Doidge, G. Karolyi, Karl Lins, Darius P. Miller and René Stulz

Journal of Finance, 2009, vol. 64, issue 1, 425-466

Abstract: This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross‐list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross‐list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of private benefits resulting from such listings. Using several proxies for private benefits related to the control and cash flow ownership rights of controlling shareholders, we find support for this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (135)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01438.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision (2005)
Working Paper: Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision (2005)
Working Paper: Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:64:y:2009:i:1:p:425-466

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Finance from American Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().