Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?

Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse and Luigi Zingales

Journal of Finance, 2010, vol. 65, issue 6, 2213-2253

Abstract: To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (486)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01614.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? (2007)
Working Paper: Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:65:y:2010:i:6:p:2213-2253

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Finance from American Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().