The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting: Evidence from the Securities Lending Market

Reena Aggarwal, Pedro Saffi and Jason Sturgess

Journal of Finance, 2015, vol. 70, issue 5, 2309-2346

Abstract: type="main">

This paper investigates voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Investors restrict lendable supply and/or recall loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for investors with greater incentives to monitor, for firms with poor performance or weak governance, and for proposals where returns to governance are likely higher. At the subsequent vote, recall is associated with less support for management and more support for shareholder proposals. Our results indicate that institutions value their vote and use the proxy process to affect corporate governance.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:70:y:2015:i:5:p:2309-2346

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