Asymmetric Information about Collateral Values

Johannes Stroebel

Journal of Finance, 2016, vol. 71, issue 3, 1071-1112

Abstract: I empirically analyze credit market outcomes when competing lenders are differentially informed about the expected return from making a loan. I study the residential mortgage market, where property developers often cooperate with vertically integrated mortgage lenders to offer financing to buyers of new homes. I show that these integrated lenders have superior information about the construction quality of individual homes and exploit this information to lend against higher quality collateral, decreasing foreclosures by up to 40%. To compensate for this adverse selection on collateral quality, nonintegrated lenders charge higher interest rates when competing against a better‐informed integrated lender.

Date: 2016
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12288

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