Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti‐Takeover Provisions

Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Giné and Maria Guadalupe

Journal of Finance, 2020, vol. 75, issue 5, 2591-2629

Abstract: We study the effects of anti‐takeover provisions (ATPs) on the takeover probability, the takeover premium, and target selection. Voting to remove an ATP increases both the takeover probability and the takeover premium, that is, there is no evidence of a trade‐off between premiums and takeover probabilities. We provide causal estimates based on shareholder proposals to remove ATPs and address the endogenous selection of targets through bounding techniques. The positive premium effect in less protected firms is driven by better bidder‐target matching and merger synergies.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12908

Related works:
Working Paper: Price and probability: decomposing the takeover effects of anti-takeover provisions (2020)
Working Paper: Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:75:y:2020:i:5:p:2591-2629

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Finance from American Finance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().