Information Asymmetry, Mispricing, and Security Issuance

Jiyoon Lee

Journal of Finance, 2021, vol. 76, issue 6, 3401-3446

Abstract: I examine the effects of information asymmetry–driven mispricing on security issuance. Using predisclosure changes in purchase obligations as a proxy for information asymmetry–driven mispricing, I find that managers avoid (prefer) issuing securities when they perceive their firms to be undervalued (overvalued). The effects of information asymmetry–driven mispricing are stronger on equity issuance than debt issuance. Consequently, undervaluation (overvaluation) causes an increase (decrease) in leverage. These effects are more pronounced for firms, periods, and securities associated with greater information asymmetry. The stock‐trading patterns that managers follow suggest that their perceived mispricing is an important factor in both private and firm‐level decisions.

Date: 2021
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