Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral

Jason Roderick Donaldson, Denis Gromb and Giorgia Piacentino

Journal of Finance, 2025, vol. 80, issue 3, 1739-1768

Abstract: We develop a theory of secured debt, unsecured debt, and debt with anti‐dilution covenants. We assume that, as in practice, covenants convey the right to accelerate if violated, but the new secured debt retains its priority even if issued in violation of covenants. We find that such covenants are nonetheless useful: They provide state‐contingent financing flexibility, balancing over‐ and underinvestment incentives. The optimal debt structure is multilayered, combining secured and unsecured debt with and without covenants. Our results are consistent with observations about debt structure, covenant violations, and waivers. They speak to a policy debate about debt priority.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13445

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Working Paper: Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral (2019)
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